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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bills and Notes-Finance Companies-Holders in Due Course
The Negotiable Instruments Law expressly sets out the requirements
which one must meet in order to become a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument. N. I. L. § 52 provides: "a holder in due course
is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
... (3) that he took it in good faith and for value; (4) that at the time
it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instru-
ment or defect in the title of the person negotiating it." The last of
these requirements is given fuller meaning by N. I. L. § 56 which pro-
vides: "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is
negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amount-
ed to bad faith."
In spite of the definiteness with which these requirements are set
out, the courts have experienced considerable difficulty, especially in re-
cent years, in applying them to a particular class of holders-finance
companies. This difficulty, and a resulting inconsistency in the decisions,
is not without cause. A brief analysis of the factual situation out of
which these cases arise and of several of the cases themselves will show
the source of this conflict.
The notes on which the finance companies seek to recover arise out
of a tri-partite transaction in which the buyer purchases certain goods
on credit from a dealer, executing his note and a conditional sales con-
tract to the dealer. The dealer, in accordance with previous arrange-
ments, immediately transfers the note and the conditional sales contract
to the finance company. As a part of this arrangement, the finance
company usually furnishes the dealer with blank forms for the notes and
the contracts, with tables from which to compute the amount of install-
ment and interest payments, and in other ways participates in the
transaction in varying degrees.
The problem resulting from the above course of dealings between
the finance company and the dealer was clearly pointed out by the Mary-
land court in Griffin v. Baltimore Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,' where
the court said: "The conflict between the desire on the one hand
to protect the conditional vendee from abusive practices and the neces-
'204 Md. 154, 159, 102 A. 2d 804, 806 (1954).
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sity on the other hand of preserving the free negotiability of commercial
paper has given rise to a divergence of opinion on this point ... ." In
approaching this problem, courts have taken different positions with re-
spect to the conflict.
One view which denies the finance company the status of a holder
in due course and which seems to be gaining more support from the
courts is very strongly expressed in Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De
Marzio.3 There the New York court said that the finance companies
have become de facto departments of the businesses without which these
businesses could not operate, and that any idea of their being separate
organizations was a mere fiction. The court added: "To pretend that
they are separate and distinct enterprises is to draw the veil of fiction
over the face of fact.' 4 The more typical statement of this view is that
the finance company is so closely connected with the transaction that
it will not be heard to say that it is a holder in due course.
Probably the most influential case espousing this view is Commercial
Credit Co. v. Childs.6 In this case the note was attached to the con-
' It was unnecessary for this court to indicate its view as to the proper solution
of the conflict because of a Maryland statute which provides that when a note is
given as a part of an installment transaction, it is to refer to the agreement out of
which it arose and, in the hands of any subsequent holder, is to be subject to the
same defenses that the buyer could assert against the seller. Another case in which
a statutory provision was construed to prevent the finance company from being a
holder in due course is General Electric Contracts Corp. v. Heimstra, 69 S. D.
78, 6 N. W. 2d 445 (1942), where the statute defined "seller" as any person who
sells goods or "any legal successor in interest" of such person. These statutes seem
to represent a retreat from the strict "actual notice" and bad faith requirements
of the N. I. L. Also, it is interesting to note that the Uniform Commercial Code
has adopted less stringent requirements, under which these same results could
possibly be reached. It provides:
"Section 1-201. General Definitions.
(19) 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned.
(25) A person has 'notice' of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists.
"Section 3-302. Holder in Due Course.
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(b) in good faith including observance of the reasonable commercial
standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person."
The above provisions would replace N. I. L. § 52 and N. I. L. § 56. The "has
reason to know" and "reasonable commercial standards" provisions of the above
sections would, seemingly, enable the courts more readily to deny the finance
company the position of a holder in due course. For a discussion of these pro-
visions and the "good faith rule" generally, see Note, 30 N. C. L. RLv. 395 (1952).
8 162 Misc. 742. 296 N. Y. Supp. 783 (City Ct. Buffalo 1937), rev'd on other
grounds, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
' Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 296 N. Y. Supp. 783, 785-786 (City Ct.
Buffalo 1937).
' 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S. W. 2d 260 (1940). This case is discussed in Notes, 53
HARv. L. REv. 1200 (1940), 20 U. oF CiN. L. Rrv. 123 (1951). Also see Note,
128 A. L. R. 729 (1940).
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tract, both were executed at the same time, and on the back of each
was a printed assignment to the finance company. Immediately after
the instruments were executed they were assigned to the finance com-
pany. The Arkansas court held that the finance company was so close-
ly connected with the transaction that it could not maintain that it was a
holder in due course; that for all intents and purposes the finance com-
pany was a party to the instrument from the beginning.(
Another case attracting considerable attention is Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works. 7 There the facts were similar
to those in the Childs case, but there was also evidence that the finance
company had been twice consulted by telephone as to the details of the
transactions. The California court in holding that the finance com-
pany was not a holder in due course said that it had actively participated
in the transaction from its inception.
In Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin,8 in addition to the facts that were
present in the Childs case, these further facts appeared: the finance
company's name was in bold print at the top and throughout the bodty
of the contract and the note, and its office was designated as the place
of payment. On the day before the sale took place, the finance com-
pany investigated the buyer's credit standing, approved the terms of both
instruments, and agreed to purchase them as soon as the transaction
was consummated. The Florida court also relied on the "close con-
nection" between the finance company and the dealer to deny the finance
company the position of a holder in due course.0
Another group of cases appear to be distinguishable from those
just considered in that they find an agency relationship to exist between
the finance company and the dealer, impute the agent's knowledge to
the principal, and thereby hold that the finance company is not a holder
in due course. Actually, however, in many of these cases this dis-
tinction appears to be one of labeling only, as the courts rely on the same
factors on which the cases previously considered relied, and place con-
' Here the finance company brought an action to recover possession of the goods,
It is usually held that in a suit to recover the goods, the buyer may assert any
defense that he has against the seller, even against the seller's transferee. 2
WILLISTON, SALES § 332 (Rev. ed. 1948). This possible distinction has apparently
been ignored by the courts following the Childs case. See Note, 152 A. L. R. 1222
(1944), where the writer attempts to weave a pattern of consistency into the cases
on the basis of this distinction.
"34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d 819 (1950). This case is discussed in Notes, 28
NoRE DAME LAw. 257 (1952), 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 580 (1950).
'63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
' Other cases den ying the finance company the status of a holder in due course
because of the close relationship between it and the dealer are Schuck v. Murdock
Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 247 S. W. 2d 1 (1952) ; International Harvester
Co. of America v. Watkins, 127 Kan. 50, 272 P. 139 (1928); C. I. T. Corp. v.
Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. 1940); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain,




siderable weight on the Childs case. Typical of this group of cases is
Palmer v. Associate Discount Corp.,'0 where the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in reaching the above
result, relied heavily on the printed forms used in carrying out the
transaction. It pointed out that the name of the finance company ap-
peared on the face of these forms in large type and that under five
different types of assignments, printed on the back, the dealer assumed
the obligation of repurchasing the automobile in case of default. These
assignments incorporated various agreements ranging from a full re-
purchase to the payment of a certain sum for a release. The court said
that the forms clearly showed that they were prepared for use in the
financing of automobile installment sales, that they revealed the dealer
and the finance company to be closely associated in the business, and
that the provisions in the printed assignments were particularly sug-
gestive of a close relationship between the dealer and the company.
The finance company, the court concluded, was acting as the dealer's
agent in demanding payment on the note."
The above cases illustrate that the courts have come to use "closely
connected," "active participation," or similar terms in describing varying
degrees of actual participation by the finance company in the original
transaction between the dealer and the purchaser. Some of these courts,
in so doing, have failed to examine the facts to determine whether there
was "actual notice" or bad faith as required by the N. I. L., but have
relied on this "closeness" in itself to infer such notice or bad faith.
Further, it appears that some of these courts have used this as a device
to arrive at results that are somewhat doubtful1 2 under the N. I. L., as
they, in justifying the results reached, look beyond the N. I. L. to policy
considerations. 13
124 F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
'l Other cases where an agency relationship was found to exist are United
States v. Schaffer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1940); Bastian-Blessing Co. v.
Stroope, 203 Ark. 116, 155 S. W. 2d 892 (1941); International Harvester Co. v.
Carruth, 23 So. 2d 473 (La. 1945).
12 In many of these cases there is nothing to indicate that such facts were
present as to charge the finance company with "actual notice" or bad faith, and
the courts relied on this "closeness" alone to deny the finance company the status
of a holder in due course.
13 These policy considerations relate mostly to the inequality in the bargaining
positions of the finance company and the buyer and the ability of the finance com-
pany to bear more readily any resulting loss. It is also contended that market-
ability is not seriously affected as the notes retain their negotiable quality in the
hands of persons beyond the finance company. This contention seems to ignore
the practical consideration that there must be some large primary market, as finance
companies, for these papers which are executed on a mass scale today, and that
by denying the finance companies the protection of being holders in due course, the
existence of such a market would be adversely affected. There would probably
be a reduction in the size of the market and an increase in the amount of financing
charges, both of which would limit the accessibility of this market to the public.
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A recent case14 taking a more discriminating approach to the prob-
lem deserves attention. There the finance company was founded by
certain dealers for the express purpose of providing financing services
solely to the members of a dealer association of which some of them were
members. The finance company, which had purchased notes from a par-
ticular dealer over a four year period, supplied blank forms containing
a printed assignment, furnished financial statement forms, and pur-
chased the instruments immediately upon the completion of the transac-
tion. The defendant purchaser contended that the finance company
was so closely associated with the transaction as to make it an original
party. In rejecting this contention the Wisconsin court expressly re-
fused to follow the Childs and Martin cases, which, actording to the
court, held that the supplying of forms by the finance company to the
dealer tended to establish direct participation by the finance company
in the transaction between the dealer and the purchaser.
The court then pointed out the following: a large segment of our
economy is dependent upon this source of credit. For the finance com-
pany to purchase these instruments executed on forms with which it is
not familiar necessitates either the delay of an investigation or the
taking of considerable risk by the finance company,, either of which
could seriously impair the usefulness of this method of financing. By
furnishing its own forms the finance company avoids both of these
dangers. The court concluded that it could see no reason why finance
companies supplying such forms should be held thereby to have made
the dealers their agents or to have participated in the sale.
Another case, in which the Louisiana court approaches the problem
with considerable frankness, is White System of New Orleans v. Hall.15
Here again the finance company furnished forms and installment tables
and agreed in advance to purchase the notes as soon as the sale was
completed. The court, in finding that the finance company was a holder
in due course, recognized that there was some justification in the view
that the finance company was using the N. I. L. as a shield to get an un-
fair advantage over the purchaser, but said that steps to correct this
would have to be taken by the legislature and not by the courts in view
of the clear provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law.'0
" Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N. W. 2d 657 (1954),
rehearing denied, 67 N. W. 2d 873 (1953).
" 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
1" Other cases holding that the course of dealings between the finance company
and the dealer did not prevent the finance company from being a holder in due
course are Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N. D.
Fla. 1954. (The court distinguished this case from the Martin case, supra note
8, in that here the name of the finance company did not appear in the forms
furnished; other finance companies, as well as the plaintiff purchased these instru-
ments; and there was no participation in the transaction by the finance company.) ;
Allied Building Credits, Inc. v. Mathewson, 335 Mich. 270, 55 N. W. 2d 826
(1952) ; Mayer v. American Finance Corp. 172 Okla. 419, 45 P. 2d 497 (1935).
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If, in fact, there is present a situation so fraught with the possibility
of fraud or unfairness that the statutory provisions of the N. I. L. are
not adequate, then it seems that legislation is the only sound solution.
Nothing but uncertainty can arise out of an encroachment upon these
statutory provisions by judicial decisions. Undoubtedly this situation
presents a ripe opportunity for collusion between unscrupulous finance
companies and dealers to take unfair advantage of the buyer.' 7 Clearly
in some cases the finance company has actually participated in the trans-
action to such an extent that it cannot be a holder in due course within
the statutory provisions. But in other cases there is no evidence of such
direct participation in the transaction by the finance company as would
charge it with "actual notice" or bad faith as required by the N. I. L.
In the absence of additional legislation, it is submitted that innocent
finance companies that come within the definition of a holder in due
course under the existing statutes, should not be deprived of that posi-
tion because of a tendency of the courts to "catalogue" them in the same
class with unscrupulous companies by the indiscriminate or deliberate
use of such terms as "close connection." Such a result seems especially
unreasonable in the light of the fact that a certain amount of participa-
tion by the finance company, as pointed out earlier, is essential in order
to avoid unreasonable delay or risks.' 8
BOBBY G. BYRD.
State Tort Claims Act-Construction
In three recent cases' the question whether the North Carolina Tort
Claims Act 2 should be strictly or liberally construed has been presented
to the court. In Lyon & Sons v. Board of Education,3 the issue was
" In Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio 311, 94 N. E. 2d 710 (1950),
the court found that the finance company engaged in a conspiracy with the dealer
to defraud the buyer. But for something of a reversal of the usual situation see
Mutual Finance Corp. v. Dickinson, 123 N. J. L. 62, 7 A. 2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1938)
and Motor Finance Corp. v. Huntsberger, 116 Ohio St. 317, 156 N. E. 111 (1927),
where the courts indicated that if any collusion existed, it was between the pur-
chaser and the dealer.
"8 Another problem which frequently arises is whether the simultaneous execu-
tion of the note with a conditional sales contract destroys its negotiability. Ac-
cording to the weight of authority it does not. 'Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d 819 (1950); Mutual Finance
Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger,
268 Wis. 143, 66 N. W. 2d 657 (1954), rehearing denied, 67 N. W. 2d 873
(1955) ; 2 WILLISTON, SALEs § 332, p. 291 (Rev. ed. 1948). But some cases have
held that negotiability is destroyed. Note, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 244 (1949).
'Floyd v. State Highway and Public Works Commission, 241 N. C. 461, 85
S. E. 2d 703 (1955) ; Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner, 241 N. C. 329,
85 S. E. 2d 386 (1955) ; Lyon & Sons v. Board of Education, 238 N. C. 24, 76
S. E. 2d 553 (1953).
2 N. C. GEx. STAT. § 143-291 et seq., as amended in 1953.
'238 N. C. 24, 76 S. E. 2d 553 (1953). Discussed in note, 32 N. C. L. REv.
242 (1954), as to subrogation.
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